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A CRITIQUE OF CARLOS NINO’S APPROACH 
JUAN CIANCIARDO1 
ABSTRACT 
Some authors have speculated about the fact that if the law were connected to moral, then it 
would not be relevant, because the moral would be enough to regulate social life. The study of 
this objection to the thesis of connection will be performed in this paper. In other words, the 
possible answers to the question about the practical difference that the law gives to the moral 
will be analyzed. Some papers written by the Argentine philosopher Carlos Nino will be the 
starting point for this task. 
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1. INTRODUCTION: NINO AND THE ARGUMENT OF THE PARADOX 
According to Javier de Lucas, the ontological question about the law (what is the law?) 
should not be regarded as a starting point. In his opinion, only can it be considered the first 
question if the real initial question is overlooked. Paraphrasing Heidegger, the latter could be 
expressed by: why the law and not violence? De Lucas says that only from this point of view 
can we define the core around which the Philosophy of Law will spin2. It is only from this 
perspective that we will be able to understand the relationship between two facts of utmost 
importance, which are provided by Sociology and Juridical Science: the relationship between 
the law and the (social) human life, and the normative condition of the law, “which always 
tries to order the behavior of man”3. It is only from this viewpoint that we will be able to 
transcend the scientistic unidimensionalism in the search for an answer to a philosophical 
question4: why the law rather than violence? 
The next pages will indirectly deal with this fundamental topic. My objective is to 
contribute to solve it by means of analyzing a problem which is deeply connected to it. This 
may be summarized in the following question: why the law rather than Morals? In other 
                                                          
2
 Javier DE LUCAS (1982, 121-125, 122). 
3
 Ibidem. 
4
 Vid. Pedro SERNA (2006, 127-141). 
3 
 
words, what is the practical difference that the law brings to Morals? Among the very many 
existing paths, I will choose to base the development of the topic on the description of the 
“paradox of the irrelevance” and its corresponding solution, such as it was offered by the 
Argentinean philosopher Carlos Nino. Then, I will criticize this proposal and sketch the central 
lines of an alternative position, which is, in my opinion, better and more useful to ultimately 
answer the question posed in this paragraph5. 
Nino referred to this topic on several occasions, two of which are worth mentioning: the 
article “La paradoja de la irrelevancia moral del gobierno y el valor epistemológico de la 
democracia”, first published in 19866; and the book Derecho, Moral y Política. Una revisión de 
la teoría general del Derecho, published in 19947, after his death. 
The Argentinean professor approached “the paradox” from two different perspectives. In 
the first paper mentioned above, the starting point Nino used was a question about the moral 
justification of democracy, “in the sense of the rule of the majority”8. Instead, in the second 
paper, the starting point was the analysis of the possible direct connection between Law and 
Politics9. 
In this paper I will only deal with the first of the approaches above mentioned. According 
to Nino, two answers have been given to the question about the moral justification of 
democracy. There are some people who focus on the “intrinsic characteristics that the 
democratic decision-taking system seems to have, which would give it a moral value which 
cannot be found in other systems that do not possess such characteristics”10. As an example of 
this type of argument, Nino proposes one according to which, democracy “enables the 
exercise of the popular sovereignty” and “ensures the consent of the governed about of the 
norms which are adopted by the rulers”. A second group of answers aims at “the beneficial 
consequences that the democratic form of government brings about”11. As examples of this 
type of argument, Nino states that democracy: a) “increases the opportunities of the 
individuals to exercise their autonomy”, b) “promotes self-respect and independent spirit”, c) 
“ensures the satisfaction of the biggest number of preferences”12. 
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According to Nino, these two types of argument are deficient. In the first case, because 
“either the properties which are taken into account are not genuine attributes of democracy, 
or because such properties materialize in such a way, that the fact that they really give value to 
democracy becomes doubtful”13. This is clearly seen as regards the argument of popular 
sovereignty: “unless we hypostatize the people as an entity which is different from the 
individuals who integrate it, democracy does not ensure that the will of the rulers will coincide 
with that of each of the governed”14. On the contrary, the second type of justifications 
provides reasons, although they are “relatively weak if they are not accompanied by another 
type of argument”15. First, such weakness comes from the type of justification which is aimed 
at because it depends on contingent circumstances and on an uncertain appraisal of the 
consequences, which “makes the value of democracy narrower than that which our intuition 
assumes”16. On the other hand, “the appraisal of the beneficial consequences of democracy is 
performed in an holistic manner, taking into account the benefit of society as a whole, which 
brings about problems of distribution, such as: why would the increase of the autonomy of the 
majority of the population, which is obtained through the democratic system, justify the 
possible restriction of the autonomy of the minority?17. 
In view of the problems of current justifications, Nino proposes a change in strategy: 
“maybe it would be more useful to inquire first about the justification of the existence of some 
sort of government, and then determine if that justification requires conditions that are only 
met by a democratic government”18. The approach he proposes is to deal with this matter as 
from the connected question about the obligatoriness of the juridical norms19. According to 
Nino, this is far from being a trivial question, so its answer must satisfy some conditions: “such 
obligatoriness comes from other norms whose obligatoriness does not depend on subsequent 
norms nor on the fact that they are obeyed or not”20 because the former would lead to an ad 
infinitum reasoning and the latter to a fallacy. This type of obligatoriness is characteristic of 
moral principles. “In other words, when we inquire about the obligatoriness of juridical norms, 
we are inquiring about their moral obligatoriness, that is, about the moral principles which, 
under certain conditions to be defined, prescribe that some rules should be obeyed”21. This is 
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connected to, according to Nino, the moral justification of the government which gives those 
(morally) obligatory norms: “the fact that a government is morally legitimate seems to be a 
good reason (which may be displaced by others) to make its rules obligatory (although there 
may be other reasons which justify the obligation to obey some rules of a morally illegitimate 
government)22. 
In this point, the initial question about the justification of democracy may be rebuilt in 
the following way: “does the fact that juridical norms are originated in the democratic process 
make any difference?”23. While trying to answer this, Nino realizes that there is a paradox, 
which he believes to be apparent: “if, in order to decide whether to obey the juridical norms or 
not, we have to turn to moral principles which will determine if they are obligatory or not —
which is the same as saying if what they prescribe should be done or not— then, why are such 
juridical norms necessary?, why do we not simply focus on the moral principles which 
determine the behavior to be adopted?”24. The paradox appears because, at least apparently, 
“it is necessary to resort to moral principles for juridical norms to be operational, so that they 
provide or complete reasons for action; but as such principles indicate on their own how we 
should act, they make those juridical norms superfluous”25. 
Once the problem has thus been stated, Nino will develop two possible answers which he 
will find unsatisfactory, and he will conclude with his own solution, which he will believe to be 
the best. In the following pages, I will focus on the Nino´s proposal, and I will criticize them. 
2. NINO´S PROPOSAL: ANALYSIS OF THE DEEPER ASSUMPTIONS 
According to Nino, there are two meta-ethical assumptions which underlie the paradox 
argument. “The first one is that there is a moral system which is independent of the social 
practices involved in the constitution, recognition and exercise of the government, in such a 
manner that when the moral citizen resorts to such system to justify the government or its 
norms, he can reach conclusions as regards what he has to do, without taking such practices 
into account”26. The second assumption refers to the epistemological scope, rather than the 
ontological one. From this point of view, it is possible to know the moral system in a manner 
independent of the social practices involved in the government and in the law. As we will see, 
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Nino will accept the existence of the first assumption, but he will reject the existence of the 
second one to reject the validity of the paradox of irrelevance. 
In the first place, there is a position that states the inexistence of an independent moral 
order (and thus, it could be concluded that it would affirm the relevance of the government 
and the law, and the unsustainability of the paradox) which is called moral nihilism and which 
rejects the existence of a moral order in itself, regardless of the form in which it would be 
understood. Nino does not consider this position due to the fact that what originated the 
inquiry was precisely the search for moral reasons considered to be sound enough to justify 
the government and the law. In other words, the question in itself —regarding the moral 
reasons that justify the government and the law— implies that the law does not justify itself 
just because it is made up by a set of prescriptions or because it is efficient, on the one hand, 
or because of the unacceptability of moral nihilism, on the other hand. 
In the second place, the social subjectivism also rejects the existence of an independent 
moral order, as the former believes that “saying that something is good is just as saying that 
the majority prefers it, or approves of it”27. According to this line of thought, “the moral order 
would be built by means of exercising democracy”28. Thus, “the moral man would find no 
reasons which are independent of the norms of the government to justify such government, 
which would, consequently, make the norms of the government superfluous”29. 
Just as Nino says, this position is unacceptable. From the viewpoint of the issue we are 
now dealing with, its key objection is that “due to its definition, it makes the position of the 
minority false, and thus, it cannot explain the moral progress (the result of the position of the 
minority becoming that of the majority), and it establishes the most absolute moral 
conservatism”30. 
A third position which rejects the assumption of the existence of an independent moral 
order is that of Habermas’s, which Nino defines as “a more complex and subtle variety of the 
ethical subjectivism of a social nature”31, “which is sometimes identified with a sort of ethical 
constructivism, and which maintains that moral reasons are built by means of the 
development of the moral discourse”. According to this position, “valid moral principles are 
those which are attained through a discussion process which is limited by certain formal 
restrictions”32. If such discussion process were identified with that which develops in the heart 
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of democracy, then not only would it justify the relevance of the government and the law, but 
it would lead to the conclusion that democracy is the only legitimate form of government. In 
other words, “we would come to the conclusion that democracy is the only form of 
government in which the latter is not superfluous for those who autonomously follow moral 
principles, as only democracy brings into the government the discussion through which 
morality is built”33. 
The latter alternative is the most attractive for Nino, who discovers and develops the 
relationship between democracy and moral discourse. Nino proposes an “epistemological 
constructivism”, which is based on the thought of Rawls and Habermas34. According to him, 
the moral discourse “is the social practice meant to obtain unanimous consensus on certain 
principles which could be used to ultimately justify actions and institutions”. Although in many 
cases it is possible to obtain such consensus, in other cases it is impossible to do so because 
“there is a relevant moment to adopt the norm or course of action and if by such moment no 
unanimous consensus has been obtained, the discussion becomes ineffective ”35. 
The solution to this problem is not to insist on achieving unanimous consensus, because 
doing so would imply favoring “the group which supports the statu quo so that no decision is 
adopted, although the group could be a minority”36. Consequently a new course of action 
should be searched for. Nino believes that the solution would be to settle a relevant time to 
take the decision and to replace the unanimous consensus for a simple majority, instead of a 
qualified majority which would give veto power to the minority37. From this point of view, 
democracy is “a succedaneum of the moral discourse”: “it is a regulated form of discussion 
which has to be resorted to when a discussion leads nowhere”. On the one hand, the moral 
discourse is a procedure of pure perfect procedural law because the criterion with which the 
result of its validity is assessed is having followed its rules, which —in turn— assures such 
validity. On the other hand, democracy is also a procedure of pure procedural law but it is 
imperfect because its rules imply drifting apart from the ideal procedure38. 
If the first deep (that is, metaethical) assumption were false, the paradox of the 
irrelevance would be overcome. That is to say, if an independent moral order did not exist 
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(independent of democracy), then democracy and the laws would be relevant. However, 
according to Nino, the independent moral order somehow exists. The explanation of this 
conclusion is that in every moral discussion the topic being discussed is the legitimacy of the 
interest defended by those who discuss, and, in turn, the discussion about the legitimacy of 
the interest implies the existence of moral principles whose validity is independent of the 
results of such discussion39. From this viewpoint, “it cannot be denied that every moral 
discourse implicitly or explicitly alludes to moral principles or theories”40. 
Because of this, a deep moral discussion should ultimately deal with which basic moral 
principles are valid41. The validity of a principle lies on its hypothetical acceptability by “all 
those who may be affected by this principle (no matter what their interests, life plans and 
personal characteristics are)” under certain conditions (full impartiality, rationality and 
knowledge)42. Such being the case, the moral principles are not the result of real discussion. 
Instead, valid moral principles are the result of an ideal consensus which is alluded to in such 
real discussion43.  
Based on this, Nino rejects what he calls “ontological constructivism”, and he accepts an 
“epistemological constructivism”. This leads him to accept, at least implicitly, the existence of 
an independent moral order, but not the existence of an independent moral knowledge (i. e., 
it is impossible to access to such moral order in an individual and isolated manner, that is, 
independent of any social practice44). He gives epistemological value to democracy “as an 
adequate method to acquire moral knowledge, as the former essentially includes the 
discussion and agreement of the majority, which are ways to approach moral truth”45. It is 
worth mentioning that in the first stages of his thinking, Nino had chosen an “ontological 
constructivism”46. 
By means of discarding the assumption of independent moral knowledge, the 
Argentinean author believes that he has also rebutted the argument of the paradox. He says: 
“opposing to what we supposed at the beginning, the second assumption is partially false as a 
general hypothesis and its inexistence makes the existence of the government relevant as far 
as it is democratic: the moral man usually wants to act according to moral reasons even if he is 
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not sure which such reasons are. The process of democratic discussion, which is reflected in 
the decisions made by the democratic authorities, can guide the moral man towards valid 
moral principles”47. On the other hand, the law is relevant because it is succedaneum of the 
moral discourse. On the contrary, a non democratic government —and its laws— would not 
allow the moral man to access a valid moral order, and in this sense, the argument of 
irrelevancy would not be affected.  
3. NOTES TOWARDS A CRITIQUE 
Once Nino´s description of the paradox has been made, and the different options that he 
analyzed and discarded together with his answer have been presented, it is time to point out 
same critiques. 
3.1. AN INSUFFICIENT RATIONALITY 
From Nino´s viewpoint, the inexistence of the independent moral knowledge is an 
argument to rebut the paradox if the government, democracy and norms are efficient means 
to develop the moral discourse. If this were not so, the paradox would be valid, and it would 
be necessary to find another way to invalidate it.  
The basic problem is that Nino´s constructivism fails. Let’s see why. He tries to build a 
proposal that would overcome dogmatism and skepticism without leaving ethical objectivity 
aside48. This is important for him because “it is impossible to offer moral solutions to 
normative problems without it”49. Such problems are those which are basic for the participants 
of a juridical practice, that is, judges and citizens. However, Nino will be dogmatic and 
skeptical. What happens is that his proposal is incapable of achieving a strong, that is, true 
ethical objectivity. The reason for this failure is that Nino´s moral is an artifact created by man, 
just a technique, a construct. The rationality of such moral, its justification, should be, 
consequently, a rationality which comes from the core of the moral itself, capable of providing 
internal coherence completion or logical-formal correction, though not truth. Nino´s reason is 
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internal, and as such, it is not useful to offer the justification for the practice itself which we 
call moral, which is not possible to be found by resorting to its ends or to the rationality itself 
of the moral performance”50. 
As regards dogmatism, Nino points out that democracy is, above all, a procedure (similar 
to the moral discourse) to learn moral principles. On the other hand, as regards skepticism, the 
Argentine author highlights a normative nature of democracy. Democracy, both procedure and 
rule, lacks sufficient justification and it is ultimately stated rather than justified in the 
discourse. In fact, “the justification of the discursive moral practice according to its ends and 
functions proposed by Nino only postpones the problem, because the discursive moral 
practice supposes, in the first place, to identify such ends and functions, and in the second 
place, to consider such ends and functions valuable”51. That is why, at the end, Nino´s 
justification of Moral “is achieved by means of the somewhat dogmatic assumption of a 
certain conception of man, which is supposed to be backed up by a sociological verification. 
This voluntaristic selection of the ends of the Moral is also what determines its consideration 
mainly as an intersubjective phenomenon”52.  
Although Nino realizes that a justification of the normative nature of democracy cannot 
be performed from a viewpoint that will reduce it to pure procedure, he only progresses half 
way (as Kaufmann has written, from procedure and form it is impossible to obtain anything but 
procedure and form). Overcoming this critique implies having some knowledge of what man is 
and of what is good for him, that is to say, an anthropology and an ethic become imperative. In 
Nino´s case, the problem is that he designs “a juridical Moral which (…) is built in the image 
and after the likeness of democracy. Instead of giving value to democracy as a succedaneum of 
the moral discourse, this author creates a moral which, because it includes the characteristics 
of democracy, leads to the defense of democracy as a morally acceptable form of government 
whose norms must always be obeyed by all the citizens”53. 
3.2. A NEW IDEOLOGICAL POSITIVISM 
My second critique consists in rejecting the practical difference between ontological and 
epistemological constructivism. Nino´s thinking evolved from the former (ontological 
constructivism) to the latter (epistemological constructivism), which he considered to be more 
                                                          
50
 Ibidem. 
51
 Idem, 148. 
52
 Idem, 149. 
53
 Idem, 150. 
11 
 
advantageous. However, from the point of view which is offered by the argument of the 
paradox, the differences seem to disappear.  
According to Nino, democracy is not the same as the moral discourse (because if this 
were so, Nino would be an ontological constructivist). In contrast, democracy is a 
succedaneum of the moral discourse, which leads to the possibility for the norms produced by 
democracy not to be morally valid. At this point, there are two problems to be solved. On the 
one hand, if democracy is a succedaneum of the moral discourse, then it is necessary to 
explain how it is possible to know if the democratic norms are valid or not. On the other hand, 
if such democratic norms are morally invalid, then it is necessary to decide what to do. 
As it is very difficult for Nino to find an answer to the first problem, he concludes that 
“except in case of error, in democratic countries it may be compulsory to act according to the 
juridical system”54. As regards the second problem, and as a consequence of the former, “from 
a practical point of view, Nino demands that this probability becomes a certainty when putting 
it into practice. According to the principle which states that the possibility to act in a morally 
correct manner should be maximized, Nino believes that the democratic discourse, even if it is 
imperfect, justifies and even demands to disregard one’s own opinion and to obey the 
norm”55. 
From this point of view, juridical norms are “exclusionary reasons” according to Raz56, 
although Nino does not define them in this way. He believes that juridical norms actually are 
epistemic reasons. That is to say, they are reasons to believe that there are reasons for action. 
In this way, he wants to preserve the autonomy of the moral, which he believes would be 
questioned if there were practical authorities, and also to escape from ideological positivism 
(which would happen if the norms were directly defined as exclusionary reasons) and, 
simultaneously, to state the enforcement of the positive law57.  
In turn this answer faces two difficulties. The first one is that “if we believe that within 
epistemological constructivism democratic norms become exclusionary reasons, autonomy, 
which is an assumption of the moral discourse, is at risk, because the receivers of the juridical 
norms will always overlook their own moral judgment because they will adopt the norm as the 
only possible guideline. On the contrary, if we believe, such as Nino did, that they are a 
epistemic reasons (…) when it is stated that an individual has reached through his own 
reflection the conviction that there are relevant moral mistakes in democratic norms, and at 
the same time he is supposed to believe «in the existence of moral reasons which favor this 
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norms», we are in fact demanding him to accept two different criteria of correction 
simultaneously, without offering any definite reason to choose one or the other”58.  
Consequently, such as Blanco stated, Nino´s proposal ultimately has a certain 
resemblance with ideological positivism, although he was looking for the opposite result59. 
3.3. A PROBLEM OF CIRCULARITY 
According to Nino, as shown above, the practical difference that the norms provide would 
come from the fact that they are an expression of democracy, which is a succedaneum of the 
moral discourse. This way the existence of democratic (and not of any other of type of) 
government would be justified. 
If we go back, we will remember that Nino connects the answer to the paradox with three 
problems: the justification of democracy (this is, in fact, his starting point), the justification of 
the government, and the justification of the law. If we analyze Nino´s approach the other way 
round, we will see that it involves trying to find out what practical difference the law will 
provide, so that the government can be justified and, depending on the type of practical 
difference we find, democracy may be justified. 
This leads to a third critique. If the practical difference of democracy can be perceived by 
studying the difference which is brought about by the existence of the government and, in 
turn, if the practical difference of the government requires the study of the relevance of the 
law, then it does not seem to be logical to explain the importance of the law by resorting to 
democracy. It is insufficient to argue that Nino is only referring to one aspect of democracy. If 
only democracy justifies democracy, then its justification is impossible. We are only able to 
describe it, thus it is impossible to limit it60. A more adequate response to this serious problem 
demands to base our reasoning on a richer anthropological description which will not consider 
autonomy and rationality absolute values61. 
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3.4. GUIDELINES FOR AN ALTERNATIVE PROPOSAL 
Why law and not only the moral? If that were so, would any moral do? Why the 
government instead of anarchy? Why democracy and not any other type of government? 
What are the limits of democracy? Who to balance what is political and what is juridical? All of 
these belong to a group of relevant questions which underlie many political and social conflicts 
of the beginning of this century. 
The classical tradition brings forth an interesting line of thinking, which I will only sketch 
here, which is based on Aristotle: man is the only political creature. Such statement can be 
interpreted as follows: the human being can only fulfill himself in the polis, in society; it is only 
in this context where he can obtain the necessary means to reach the ends he tends to. The 
polis is autarchic (as opposed to the family and other communities) because it has the capacity 
to produce these means62. For this reason, the polis is also a way of basic coexistence63. 
As within the polis, men coexist, there are social relations that call for coordination and 
adopting criteria that would solve the conflicts that might arise. This role cannot be completely 
played by the moral due to several reasons: first, because there are people who are not willing 
to abide by moral rules; and second, because the moral is inconclusive and indeterminate. To 
overcome these deficiencies there are two elements which are necessary: on the one hand, an 
authority which will guide the polis towards autarchy (the common good) and, on the other 
hand, the law which punishes some immoralities (not all) and concludes and determines all the 
aspects relevant to the common good which are not solved by the moral64. 
At least as a hypothesis, it seems it would be possible to accept the violent imposition of 
the moral on those who are not willing to obey it, the violent resolution of coordination 
problems and conflicts, and the violent settlement of those aspects of the moral which the 
moral neither concludes nor determines. However, morality itself prescribes the 
acknowledgement of the other man as equal. Men acknowledge man as an end in himself, 
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which demands respect and banishes any instrumentalization65. For this reason, the Moral 
prescribes that the solution to conflicts and the solutions to problems of coordination should 
be enforced without violence, respecting the demand for recognition. Neoconstitutionalism 
has coined the idea of reasonableness to describe those norms which could be considered 
juridical because they comply with the requisite mentioned above. A solution is reasonable if it 
is possible to justify it through attractive reasons. That is to say, it is a solution which is capable 
of arousing rational consensus. It is possible to argue that the best way to find such reasons is 
to search for them within the democratic dialogue. The democratic deliberation assures an 
important minimum of respect: every man should be considered a valid social partner or 
interlocutor. 
The need to create reasonable norms that punish some immoralities (those which 
seriously affect the common good); that coordinate behaviors and solve social conflicts; and 
that conclude and determine what the moral norms do not conclude or determine, justifies 
the need  for a government, and that such government should be democratic. Both a 
government and democracy are demanded by the common good. Politics and moral (due to its 
being inconclusive and indeterminate) demand a way of coexistence (the law) which calls for a 
government. And the government must be democratic because only democracy (by treating 
the other one as another one) can provide those norms which are reasons for action entrusted 
with authority (although it may achieved in different degrees or even it may not achieved 
because its actions are never perfect). Democracy is not a succedaneum of moral discourse. In 
fact, it is a demand of the moral discourse, which will always be, especially as regards the 
relations with others, inconclusive and indeterminate.  
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